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激励理论 英文本PDF|Epub|txt|kindle电子书版本网盘下载

激励理论 英文本
  • （法）让·雅克·拉丰（Jean-Jacques Laffont）著 著
  • 出版社： 北京：北京大学出版社
  • ISBN：7301050771
  • 出版时间：2001
  • 标注页数：757页
  • 文件大小：29MB
  • 文件页数：773页
  • 主题词：

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图书目录

Part Ⅰ General Equilibrium and Incentives3

1.On Moral Hazard in General Equilibrium Theory(with E.HELPMAN),Journal of Economic Theory,10:8-23,1975.3

2.Optimism and Experts against Adverse Selection in a Competitive Economy,Journal of Economic Theory,10:284-308,1975.19

3.Courts against Moral Hazard,Journal of Mathematical Economics,3:269-283,1976.44

4.Taxing Price Makers(with R.GUESNERIE),Journal of Economic Theory,19:423-455,1978.59

5.On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information,Econometrica,53:1-29,1985.92

Part Ⅱ Foundations of Incentive Theory à propos the Free Rider Problem123

6.Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods(with J.GREEN),Econometrica,45:427-438,1977.123

7.Partial Equilibrium Approach to the Free-Rider Problem(with J.GREEN and E.KOHLBERG),Journal of Public Economics,6:375-394,1976.135

8.A Differential Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms(with E.MASKIN),is Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences,J.J.Laffont ed.,North-Holland,289-308,1979.155

9.A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms(with E.MASKIN),Econometrica,48:1507-1520,1980.175

10.Nash and Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments(with E.MASKIN),Journal of Mathematical Economics,10:17-47,1982.189

11.On the Robustness of Strategy Proof Mechanisms(with R.GUESNERIE),Journal of Mathematical Economics,10:5-15,1982.220

12.The Theory of Incentives:An Overview(with E.MASKIN),in Advances in Econom ic Theory,W.Hildenbrand ed.,Cambridge University Press,Ch.2,31-94,1982.231

Part Ⅲ Advanced Topics in Incentive Theory297

13.Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design(with J.GREEN),Review of Economic Studies,53:447-456,1986.297

14.Incentive Theory with Data Compression(with J.GREEN),in Volume in Honor of K.ARROW,W.Heller,R.Starr,and D.Starrett,eds.,Cambridge University Press,Ch.10,239-253,1986.307

15.Limited Communication and Incentive Compatibility(with J.GREEN),in Volume in Honor of L.Hurwicz,T.Groves,R.Radner,S.Reiter ed.,University of Minnesota Press,Ch.11,308-329,1987.322

16.Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Two-Dimensional Characteristics(with E.MASKIN and J.C.ROCHET),in Information,Incentives, ＆ Economics Mechanisms,Volune in Honor of L.Hurwicz,T.Groves,R.Radner,S.Reiter ed.,University of Minnesota Press,Ch.8,256-266,1987344

Part Ⅳ Collusion355

17.On Coalititon Incentive Compatibility(with J.GREEN),Rewiew of Economic Studies,46:243-254,1979.355

18.Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy,Journal of Law,Economics,and Organization,6(2):301-324,1990.367

19.The Politics of Government Decision-Making:A Theory of Regulatory Capture(with J.TIROLE),Quarterly Journal of Economics,106:1089-1127,1991.391

20.Collusion under Asymmetric Information(with D.MARTIMORT),Econometrica,65(4):875-911,1997.430

21.Reciprocal Supervision,Collusion,and Organizational Design(with Mathieu MELEU),Scandinavian Journal of Economics,99(4):519-540,1997.467

22.Collusion and Delegation(with D.MARTIMORT),The RAND Journal of Economics,29(2):280-305,1998.489

23.Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior(with D.MARTIMORT),The RAND Journal of Economics,30(2):232-262,1999.515

24.Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation(with D.MARTIMORT),Econometrica,68(2):309-342,2000.546

Part Ⅴ Incomplete Contracts583

25.Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts(with J.GREEN),Annales d'Economie et de Statistique,25/26:123-150,1992.583

26.Non Verifiability,Costly Renegotiation,and Efficiency(with J.GREEN),Annales d'Economie et de Statistique,36:82-95,1994.611

Part Ⅵ Lack of Commitment629

27.Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem(with J.GREEN),Econometrica,55(1):69-94,1987.629

28.Implementation through Sequential Unanimity Games(with J.GREEN),in Cooperative Models in International Relations Research,M.Intrilligator and U.Luterbacher,Kluwer Academic Publishers,Boston,151-175,1994.655

29.Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement(with J.TIROLE),Review of Economic Studies,57:597-625,1990.680

30.The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts(with J.TIROLE),Econometrica,56:1153-1175,1988.709

31.Comparative Statics of the Optimal Dynamic Incentive Contract(with J.TIROLE),European Economic Review,31:901-926,1987.732

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