COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW AND ECONOMICSPDF|Epub|txt|kindle电子书版本网盘下载

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1. Introduction1

1.1. Introduction1

1.2. Subject matter2

1.3. Methodology3

1.3.A. Methodology and concepts used in the economic analysis of law4

1.3.B. Methodology and concepts used in comparative contract law7

1.3.C. Steps of comparative enquiry9

1.3.D. Methodology and concepts used in comparative contract law and economics11

1.4. Outline of the book13

2. Pre-contractual Duty to Disclose Information15

2.1. Introduction15

2.2. Prior literature17

2.3. Optimal model rule24

2.3.A. Preliminaries: Information-some conceptual distinctions26

2.3.B. Preliminaries: Mistake or duty of disclosure27

2.3.C. Optimal model rule: Fundamental principle30

2.3.C.Ⅰ. Optimal amount of information34

2.3.D. Upgraded model rule: Utilization, productive and redistributive information35

2.3.D.I. Deliberately acquired productive or redistributive information37

2.3.D.Ⅱ. Deliberately acquired pure redistributive information39

2.3.D.Ⅲ. Casually acquired productive or redistributive information39

2.3.D.Ⅳ. Casually acquired purely redistributive information43

2.3.D.Ⅴ. Simultaneously productive/redistributive information43

2.3.D.Ⅵ. Administering and enforcement costs45

2.3.D.Ⅶ. Right to lie47

2.3.E. Synthesis: Towards an optimal doctrine49

2.4. French law: Duty to inform （reticence dolosive）52

2.4.A. General overview52

2.4.B. Assessment of current doctrine57

2.4.C. Assessment of the law in action61

2.4.D. Conclusions on French law69

2.5. English law70

2.5.A. General overview71

2.5.B. Assessment of current doctrine75

2.5.C. Assessment of the law in action76

2.5.C.Ⅰ. Further exemptions86

2.5.D. Conclusions on English law87

2.6. American law87

2.6.A. General overview88

2.6.B. Assessment of current doctrine93

2.6.C. Assessment of the law in action95

2.6.C.Ⅰ. Further exemptions101

2.6.D. Conclusions on American law102

2.7. German law: Duties to inform （aufklarungspflichten）102

2.7.A. General overview103

2.7.B. Assessment of current doctrine107

2.7.C. Assessment of the law in action110

2.7.D. Conclusions on German law116

2.8. Conclusion117

3. Unforeseen Contingencies118

3.1. Introduction118

3.2. Prior literature121

3.3. Foreseeability127

3.3.A. Analysis applied135

3.3.B. Synthesis and implications137

3.4. Optimal model rule139

3.4.A. Preliminaries139

3.4.B. Optimal model rule142

3.4.B.Ⅰ. Onerous performance-slight rise in cost of performance-no excuse143

3.4.B.Ⅱ. Excessively onerous performance-performance ineffcient144

3.4.B.Ⅲ. Performance useless-frustration of purpose148

3.4.B.Ⅳ. Performance still efficient-adjustment or discharge150

3.4.B.Ⅴ. Operational issues of adjustment rule-court’s application153

3.4.B.Ⅵ. Decrease in costs of performance156

3.4.C. Synthesis: Towards an optimal discharge/adjustment doctrine157

3.5. French law （revision pur imprevision）159

3.5.A. General overview160

3.5.B. Analysis165

3.5.B.Ⅰ. Assessment of current doctrine165

3.5.B.Ⅱ. Assessment of the law in action173

3.5.B.Ⅲ. Broad interpretation of impossibility requirement184

3.5.B.Ⅳ. Purpose frustrated189

3.5.B.Ⅴ. Strikes constituting force majeure192

3.5.C. French administrative law194

3.5.C.Ⅰ. French administrative law- law in action195

3.5.D. Conclusions on French law199

3.6. English common law200

3.6.A. General overview201

3.6.A.Ⅰ. Short comparative and terminological note206

3.6.B. Analysis207

3.6.B.Ⅰ. Assessment of current doctrine207

3.6.B.Ⅱ. Assessment of the law in action213

3.6.B.Ⅲ. Excessively onerous performance-discharge of contract214

3.6.B.Ⅳ. Merely more onerous performance-no excuse218

3.6.B.Ⅴ. Simultaneous substantial increase in cost and in value- performance efficient225

3.6.B.Ⅵ. Purpose frustrated229

3.6.C. Conclusions about English law235

3.7. American law （absolute impossibility, frustration and impracticability）235

3.7.A. General overview237

3.7.A.Ⅰ. A brief comparative and terminological note242

3.7.B. Analysis243

3.7.B.Ⅰ. Assessment of current doctrine243

3.7.B.Ⅱ. Well established rules of law - traditional categories of impracticability excuse253

3.7.B.Ⅲ. Assessment of the law in action254

3.7.B.Ⅳ. Excessively onerous performance -discharge of contract254

3.7.B.Ⅴ. Merely more onerous performance -no excuse263

3.7.B.Ⅵ. Simultaneous substantial increase in costs and value - performance still efficient266

3.7.B.Ⅶ. Purpose frustrated269

3.7.C. Conclusions on American law272

3.8. German law （storung der geschaftsgrundlage）272

3.8.A. General overview273

3.8.A.Ⅰ. Short comparative and terminological note279

3.8.B. Analysis280

3.8.B.Ⅰ. Assessment of current doctrine281

3.8.B.Ⅱ. Assessment of the law in action289

3.8.B.Ⅲ. Excessively onerous performance -discharge of contract290

3.8.B.Ⅳ. Merely more onerous performance -no excuse294

3.8.B.Ⅴ. Simultaneous substantial increase in costs and value - performance still efficient297

3.8.B.Ⅵ. Purpose frustrated - generally no excuse301

3.8.C. Conclusions on German law306

3.9. Conclusion307

4. Unilateral Termination309

4.1. Introduction309

4.2. Prior literature311

4.3. Optimal model rule315

4.3.A. Preliminaries and terminological distinctions316

4.3.B. Optimal model rule - fundamental principles317

4.3.C. Unilateral termination of long-term contracts for an indefinite period of time318

4.3.C.Ⅰ. Optimal risk allocation322

4.3.C.Ⅱ. Relation-specific investments323

4.3.C.Ⅲ. Reducing transaction costs324

4.3.D. Termination upon specific provision325

4.3.D.Ⅰ. Optimal risk allocation326

4.3.D.Ⅱ. Relation-specific investment327

4.3.D.Ⅲ. Reducing transaction costs328

4.3.E. Termination of fixed-term contracts328

4.3.E.Ⅰ. Optimal risk allocation330

4.3.E.Ⅱ. Relation-specific investment330

4.3.E.Ⅲ. Reducing transaction costs331

4.3.F. Synthesis: Towards an optimal unilateral termination doctrine331

4.4. French law （resiliation）332

4.4.A. General overview333

4.4.B. Analysis335

4.4.B.Ⅰ. Assessment of current doctrine336

4.4.B.Ⅱ. Assessment of the law in action337

4.4.C. Conclusions on French law340

4.5. English law341

4.5.A. General overview341

4.5.B. Analysis344

4.5.B.Ⅰ. Assessment of current doctrine344

4.5.B.Ⅱ. Assessment of the law in action347

4.5.C. Conclusions on English law350

4.6. American law351

4.6.A. General overview351

4.6.A.Ⅰ. Terminological note354

4.6.B. Analysis354

4.6.B.Ⅰ. Assessment of current doctrine355

4.6.B.Ⅱ. Assessment of the law in action357

4.6.C. Conclusions on American law361

4.7. German law362

4.7.A. General overview362

4.7.B. Analysis365

4.7.B.Ⅰ. Assessment of current doctrine365

4.7.B.Ⅱ. Assessment of the law in action368

4.7.C. Conclusions on German law369

4.8. Conclusion370

5. Summary and Conclusions373

5.1. Summary on Chapter 2: Pre-contractual duty to disclose information374

5.2. Summary on Chapter 3: Unforeseen contingencies374

5.3. Summary on Chapter 4: Unilateral termination376

5.4. General conclusions378

5.5. Final remarks378

Index381